A "world model" is constructed where precedent-searching is one of the pri-.-iary driving mechanisms. The simulation assumes that nations in the sys'eem are utility maximizers but that they have relatively primitive decision mechanisms and that they are strongly influenced by their previous short-term successful behavior and the short-term success of other states in the system. This model of foreign policy decision-making has been heavily influenced by recent artificial intelligence studies and simulations. States in the simulation follow one of three distinct strategies to maximize growth: imperialism, militarism, or trade and, in each mode, = state can increase or decrease its level of behavior, or lit can switch modes. The objective of simulation is to get away from the purely mechanistic difference equation formulations of world models while avoiding overly rational and optimizing models. Precedent-based decision-making is plausible for a goal-seeking system which, because of bureaucratic constraints, is capable of only fairly simple behaviors. The simulation uses a system vaguely characteristic of the 19th century world system with 5 large, 5 medium, and 10 small nations. The resulting behavior is generally plausible with bounded and fairly diverse activity depending on the random experimentation involved. Because of the weak bounded rationality, the system does not lock on to a single pattern of behavior based on initial conditions and so, for example, siutations exist where medium powers eventually become stronger than the initial major powers. The most common pattern is one of a combination of trade links and imperialism, with about half the minor powers being colonized and some exchange of colonies occurring through conflict. An appendix, "Key Elements of PWorld Program", and a bibliography are included. (Author/KWL) *********************************************************************** * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made * * from the original document. * *********************************************************************** 
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Introduction
World models have proliferatRd since their initi4I devel9pment tyi Ilitatl.n-11140lne models in the 19511s by Harold Guetzkow (see, e.g. Guetzkow and Valadez.I9S1) and their popularization in the 1970's as all-machine models through the efforts of the Club of Rome (see, e.g. Meadows, Richardson and Bruckmann,1932; Deutsch et al:1977) , the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (see Hickman. 1983 ) and others. A recent survey (Siegmann.19S5) lists 27 different major modeling efforts worldwide. For a survey of the current "state of the art" in global modeling. see 'Ward 11985 ) and Hughes (1985) .
The dominant tendency in all-ma chine models has been to focus on systems of difference equations. This is convenient since these equations are easily simulated with a digital computer; it is consistent with the engineering ancestry of most of the all-machine simulations (as well as with the related Richardson modeling tradition in international relations); and it allows the systems to be fairly easily estimated using conventional statistical techniques. The difference equation approach to global modeling is certainly a good first approximation, and judging from the proliferation of such models, it has a fair amount of heuristic utility as well.
The disadvantage of the difference equation approach, however, is that it ignores most of the cognitive characteristics of human foreign polity decision making. Ipso facia it would appear that human beings are to some extent goal seeking, that they respond to observed activities in their environment in qualitative as well as quantitative ways, and that they have memory which can be utilized for learning. The difference equation approach is also somewhat unsatisfactory because the resulting models tend to exhibit either too much regularity --producing a world which is unrealistically consistent and reflects only the extrapolation of existing trends --or alternatively the models yield catastrophic behavior where the model blithely sidles up to the edge of an abyss without taking ameliorative action, and then just as blithely hops into the abyss.
The most common solution to the lack of cognition in these models ig to use the so-called "rational choice" approach. which substitutes for deterministic mechanisms of the difference equation an expected utility optimizing mechanism borrowed from economics Rational choice models in international relations have been popularized by Brito and Intriligator (19731974.1982; Intriligator and Brito. 19S4) . Bueno de Mesquito (19S1) and the dynamic optimization work of Gillespie and Zinnes (1975 197.197S Unfortunately, these models have usually been applied only in the two-nation case in large part because of the complex specifications and mathematical manipuiations required to use the models --and as a consequence they have had little direct application in the 4 global modeling literature. An additional problem with the work particularly in the dynamic optimization models of Gillespie et a I is that an excessive degree of rationality is called for, particularly when one considers that decisions being modeled are in the real world implemented by complex bureaucracies which tend to favor simple solutions tc problems and do not appear to use a great deal of foresight.
Pattern Matching itnd Learning
As I have argued extensively elsewhere (Schrodt. 1984a,b; Schrodt, 1983a) , an alternative to difference equation and rational optimization in modeling international systems is to emphasize the key role of orecedent-seeking in organizational decisionmaking. When precedent-seeking is combined with some simple performance criteria, it can also provide for simple learning-by-example by the system. With modern computer programming techniques. these characteristics of cognitive behavior can easily be incorporated into a global simulation.
A precedent-based approach starts from the obvious fact that decision-making individuals and organizations have an base of past experiences. When trying to predict the consequences of a particular option, that data base is searched for past experiences which match the existing situation as closely as possible according to some pattern-matching crite Ion. Those past experiences are then used to determine the current action: one looks at the previous cases to predict in a heuristic fashion what the likely consequences of various possible responses to an event will be. The response which produces the best predicted outcome is the one implemented.
In general, the pattern matching approach seeks to match events with past events which are in some sense similar. This approach as been variously termed "analogy" or "precedent". The use of analogy with historical sequences in the context of foreign policy analysis is discussed by Mefford (1984) , formalizing the notions of ''focused comparison" developed by George (1979) . Precedent-based apvoaches are used in Mefford (1984) . Anderson (1%1 ) , Bonham and Shapiro(1976) , Tanaka (1934) , Christensen.(1972 ), and Greenberg(1976 ) . Other information-intensive approaches which utilize heuristics in addition to precedent are found in Bennett t 1984 ), Isard and Lewis (19541 Majeski (1985 ) and Sylvan and Maieski 1953) , and more generally the 'computational modeling" or "artificial intelligence" approach to modeling international events. The potential importance of this in political reasoning is also discossed in Simon (19S5) The argument for the analogical approach can be made from several standpoints. As Melford (1981) illustrates with respect to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and othtr examples, the incidence of analogy is very high in published justifications for policy actions, and in reported policy discussions. While analogy is rarely used as an empirical technique. it clearly is a ,common mode of reasoning in policy formulation --for example, the analogical terms "Munich", "Vietnam", "Pearl Harbor" and so ferth are some of the most powerful constructs in the foreign policy lexicon of the United States. The use of these analogies may appear in hindsight to be inappropriate or inconsistent but they are used .
Studies of individual decision-mating and artificial intelligence research have also emphasized the role of analogy Herbert Simon (1979; Newell and Simon.1972 ) is one of the most visible proponents of this view; Carbonell (1983 ) and Winston (1979) also discuss the approach in detail. One also observes that in the teaching of international relations and foreign policy, virtually all instructors spend a large amount of time building an historical background upon which to analyze events by use of precedent. Even a behavioralist IR text such as Russett and Starr (1984) contains far more history than, for example, Sainuelson's Economics. The introductory chapters of Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations contain on average four historical examples per page.
The use of pattern-matching in the policy model is consistent with the fact that the human brain is considerably more efficient at the storage and recall of information than at the logical manipulation of information. As Simon (1985) has pointed out, extensive experimentation in the cognitive sciences has shown that the human brain is extraordinarily good at recall --a process which seems to operate in parallel on billions of items of information but is constrained in logical processing to a slow, serial process operating on a limited (around six items) short-term memory cache. For example, most evidence indicates that. chess experts use large amounts of pattern recognition as shortcuts to problem solving, and their performance slonTs considerably when they actually have to problem-solve. Mathematicians work the same way, and most research in expert systems confirms the requirement for a large base of 'experience through which the system can find a solution.
In other words, thinking is often recall masquerading as reasoning. This emphasis on the empirically demonstrated limitation of One logical reasoning capabilities of the brain leads to the general approach of "bounded rationality" as. a modeling technique. which is more cognitively complex than difference equatione, mates fewer demands or assumptions about human reasoning than rational choice. and is mathematically and conceptually more complex than either just as humans tend to employ recall as a technique, an organization may depend largely on precedent and standard operating procedure when dealing with day-to-da problems, and a mature organization may develop sufficient experience that analytical problem solving is virtually eliminated until such time as an unprecedented crisis occurs 6 If this is in fact the typical pattern of organizational behavior. then any attempt at the construction of a political reasoning model solely out of logical principles will at best only partially approximate actual behavior. The question for home) paliticus is not only "what do I want?" but also "what is attainable and how?" pothics as the ari of the possible The single strongest argument for showing that something is attainable is to show that it is has been attained in the past. and to use the method by which it was attained by as a guide. That in turn means that behavior will be driven by historical information at least as much as by logic or rules.
As an organization gains experience that is. accumulates historical information its behavior might be expected to change without any change in the policy, theory or preferences. In a word, organizations can learn. For example, the USA committed large numbers of Marines to Lebanon in 1957 and with the objective of stabilizing the country. but the unpleasant experiences suffered by the Marines in 1983 makes future deployments less likely. This change is due to a modification of the experience of the organization rather than a modification of objective. In this fashion the model provides a mechanism whereby changing the thforillalion base or history of the decision-maker rather than changing the rules of decision-making could alter behavior. This is in line with Simon's (1982:63) approach of modeling cognitive behavior as a set of simple rules operating in a complex environment, rather than complex rules operating in a simple environment.
Ironically. as Simon (1985) cogently pointed out to the political science discipline, the research in the cognitive sciences has been largely ignored by the decision-oriented social sciences, despite what would seem to be rather obvious connections between the two. Milton Friedman's infamous (1953) argument notwithstanding, it takes an extraordinary leap of blind faith yea, a demonstration of willful ignorance in the face of falsifying evidence usually confined to the study of economics --to base dynamic models on mechanisms which virtually all of our empirical evidence indicates could not possibly be occurring. Yet the dominant mechanisms in most dynamic work are either blind, memory-free difference equations or analytically complex dynamic optimization routines. Much simpler approaches which utilize characteristics such as lagged feedback. learning pattern recognition which are clearly part of the cognitive repertoire of every normal member of the human species have not had a major impact The model proposed in paper will demonstrate in a simple fashion how some of these things might be done.
2. The Model
The model discussed in this paper is a simple implementation --a test-bed in a sense --of a world model which would incorporate some simple cognitive components. The model itself is relatively small about SOO lines of Pascal code and does not have the sectoral or actor complexity of a SARUM or GLOBUS. However, the actors in the model are more cognitively complex than those in many existing models. In particular. the actors.
*0 Choose among a discrete set of behaviors (policies) which differ qualitatively and focus only a single mode of behavior at a time 0 Compare their current performance with earlier expectations about that performance, and if the policy is causing a deterioration in performance, it is changed.
0 "Observe" the success and failure of policies pursue6 by other actors in the system and use successful policies as a model for their own behavior.
As such, the model incorporates in at least a primitive fashion the notions of bounded optimization and feedback, precedent-seeking and learning discussed above. In a very distant -way, the model is related to the model of Zinnes, Van Houwelling and Van Atta (1959) , which incorporated qualitative behavior shifts in a balance of power framework and used a complex recursive forecasting capability to decide optimal policies. The Zinnes.
Van Houwelling and Van Atta model did not use precedent-seeking. was in a strictly balance of power framework without an economic or imperialist component and also to my knowledge was never successfully implemented. The use of comparison with mher nations is also found in Bremer's (1977) SIPER model, itself based on Guetzkow's earlier INS work; SIPER is also interesting in that the decision component makes heavy use of a rule base. SIPER appears to be more heavily driven by its difference equations that this model, however, and employs "smarter" and faster decision-making algorithms. The underlying assumption in this model is that of bounded rationality: a world which is "muddled through" by organizations which try various discrete policies and change those policies very slowly. As noted earlier, this is quite consistent with most. studies of bureaucratic decision-making and is, in a highly simplified fashion, in the organizational behavior triVition of Simon. The 'learning" involved in this model is doubtlessly tol. simple, as it does not use more advanced machine learning. techniques (see e.z. Schrod: 19S6a.19S6b ) and does not incorporate a history beyond the start of the simulation. so tnal information about the utility of various policies is learned only slowly and through empirical experimentation. Precedent searching is done only over the immediate past 8 rather than the distant past. Nonetheless, this is not totally unlike the real world, particularly in a situation where the structure of the system has undergone major change and the actors are not fully familiar with how the new system will operate.
The model proposed here seeks to model the development of the world system in the pre-nuclear age. Vaguely, the period under consideration would be about 1700-1900. though since this work is purely exploratory no attempt has been made to empirically estimate the key characteristics of the system 2.1_ National Characteristics
The model uses a simple three-sector model of the economy: Foreign trade and profits from colonies GDP: everything other than the above The national performance is measured by a single variable called GNP which is defined as.
GNP = GDP Milex -Trade
GDP is assumed to have Ilnear growth (i.e. ceteris parihus is exponential) and provides the primary mechanism for growth which funds other activities. GDP(t.1) = a * GDP(t)
Trade can also contribute to the growth in GNP: military adventures subtract from it..
In the model. Milex is always adjusted as a percentage of GNP, rather than in fixed amounts. Thus growth in either GDP or trade can increase the amount of military power available. When comparisons of military power are made. they are done in terms of absolutes.
Modes of Behavior
The model postulates seven different modes of behavior, which roughly correspond to the types of policies which a nation could undertake. This has no effect: all parameters (e.g. colonies, Milex. trading partners) remain fixed. This is the most common policy and nations revert to it when policies fail to be successful.
Liberal
In the Liberal mode, the nation seeks to find another trading partner. In the model "trade" involves a fairly major benefit. and in a sense is taken to be a serious committment to track (e.g. along the lines of policies undertaken by nations such as Switzerland and Japan). Trade is made with another nation in the liberal or neutral mode and is done in fixed "chunks. ' (e.g. 2% ) . Trade is established with the nation ciosest in GNP. and it is possible to have more than one "chunk" of trade with a given nation. A nation may trade to a maximum of Max_Trade chunks of GNP.
The actual amount of trade between two nations in a given year is equal to the small of the chunks --in other words, there are no trade imbalances (unlike the real world._ ).
The model assumes a comparative advantage to trade, so the effect of trade on change GNP is some multiple Trade_Mult (e.g. 1.02) of the amount of trade
Autarkic
The autarkic model breaks off trading relations. Trade with the poorest nation on the current trading list is dropped.
Because of the no-risk benefit of trade, this may appear to be a strategy which is always disadvantageous. This is not the case since a rapidly growing nation may have reached the maximum level of trade and still have links with poor nations which were established earlier. These are advantageous to break off, then new links can be establishe-:! with wealthier nations.
Beilicist
Bellicist nations do two things. First, they look for a nation to attack. The criterion is to choose the nation which has the largest number of colonies and which is smaller than oneself. As a simplification, wars last only a single year, though one can engage in the same war in multiple years. Consistent with observed human behavior in the absence of alliances, once a nation is engaged in a war it does not become involved in another in that year. This absence of alliance activity is, of course, a major simplification of the model and strongly differentiates it from realist-based models such as Leavitt (1971) and Zinnes, Van Atta and Van Hon/ening (1969) .
Wars can end either as draws or as victories. The outcome is based on a probability
where Max_Mil is the military expenditures (i.e. GNP4Miles) of the more powerful nation and Min_Mil is the military expenditures of the weaker nation. This probability is zero when the two nations are equal and goes to one when Mas_Mil >> Mia_Mil. If there is a victory, the stronger nation always wins, another a simplification. Whether a war ends in a victory or a draw, it costs (i.e. decreases GNP) both natie as involved as a proportion of their military expenditures. This proportion is War_Cost Max_Min which is maximized when Max_Mil -Min_Mil War_Cost is a proportionality constant which is set to 1.0 in the initial experiments.
A Draw results only in the decrease of GNP and the Mode of both nation is set to Neutral,on the iogic that after a war both nations will be engaged in rebuilding for a time.
A Victory by the stronger nation involves a transfer of all of the colonies from the defeated nation to the victor, a decrease in the Milex of the defeated nation, and a transfer of War_Spoils percent of the defeated nations GNP to the victor. The mode of the defeated nation is changed to Neutral; the mode of the victor does not change.
If a bellicist nation cannot start a war, it increases the amount of GNP devoted to military expenditures by a fixed amount in order to raise the military expenditures to a point where an attack is possible, Obviously only a single nation (the weakest) will not be able to attack anyone, so this feature is unlikely to have much effect on the simulation.
If a bellicist nation is a colony, it revolts: it attacks the colonizer. Because colonies are substantially weaker than the colonizers, they never win the revolt, but the War_Cost of the attack costs the colonizer and reduces the wealth of the colony so that it is more likely to be let go. War_Spoils are not distributed in revolts.
Note that the bellicist policy in this simulation is fairly expensive (a characteristic which it shares with the real world...) and will pay off only through the elimination of rivals, the acquisition of colonies, and attacking nations which are substantially weaker
Pacifist
The pacifist mode decreases Milex by a fixed amount. which in turn will increase the amount of economic growth. Milex cannot be decreased below a level Imperialist A nation in the imperialist mode seeks to acquire c.olonies To acquire a colony, the nation seeks out the weakest nation in the system, and the GNP of that nation must be below a certain percentage of the GNP of the imperialist (e.g. 25%). Imperialism succeeds if the imperialist has a victory in a war with the potential colony: all of the effects of .wa discussed above hold for colony acquisition.
The effects of acquiring a colony are the following:
Colonizer:
Colony:
I. Increase Milex by fixed amount to account for cost of maintaining control of the colony
Optimization Rule
Optimization in the simulation is essentially rule-based and involves first choosing the mode of behavior, then making some fairly simple choices in the implementation of that mode.
The key variable in deciding whether to change policies is to figure out whether the nation is doing as well in terms of GNP growth as it had projected. This is measured by a variable called Performance, which is the ratio of the current GNP to the GNP level projected two years before. The projections assume that everything in the system remains fixed: it just iterates the system forward two years with no policy changes or other activities.
If Faformance is worse than a level Bacl_Policy then the nation either reverses the policy it followed when the projection was made or, if that policy was Neutral (i.e. the policy itself wasn't doing anything, so by inference something elsewhere in the system must have changed), the nation adopts the policy of the nation with the highest performance currently in the system. In this way a nation which is doing poorly can see what nations which are doing well are doing, and try to follow that examp1,1. This is the precedent-based characteristic of the model, which essentially assumes "copy-cat" behavior. If a nation is currently in Neutral, and sees diminishing performance, then it looks to see what other nations in the system are doing successfully. It adopts as policy the Mode of the nation with the best observed performance at the moment. In other words, short-term precedent-seeking allow the nation to have access to the results of the experimentation of all of the nations in the system. This is a somewhat different precedent-searching mechanism that the models discussed earlier, since it relies on current behavior of other nations in the system rather than past behavior of the nation engaged in the policy. It is used for two reasons. First and most obviously, it does not require as much storage as a full historically-based precedent system. Second, it reduces the chance that the system will find an inappropriate precedent by confining the search to the recent past, when the system was in more or less the same configuration.
If the performance level is better than Bad_Policy but less than OK...Policy. and the a non-Neutral policy has been followed for more than one year, policy is shifted to Neutral This is designed to fix the parameters at whatever they are at the moment.
If the performance is better than 01:_Policy. then the nation continues with whatever policy it was following. Thus. for example, if it was decolonizing, it will drop another colony; if it was bellicist. it will start another war and so forth.
Experimentation
The other cause of policy change is experimentation the random selection of policy when one is in the Neutral mode. This is done with a fixed probability whenever the nation is in the Neutral mode and, in the experiments I have done. accounts for a lot of the change in the system. Experimentation has two roles. From a modeling standpoint, it is a realistic addition to the model -which reflects stochastic shifts in governmental decision-making. For example, a nation may decide to decolonize because of an assortment of reasons that are not directly related to the success or failure of that colonial policy. The use of random experimentation serves as a surrogate for vastly more complex internal changes in government and public opinion which cause policies to change even when the external environment has not significantly changed. From the standpoint of the running of the simulation, the experimentation provides the input which allows the system to show diverse behavior and to learn. The rule that mediocre performance moves a nation to a Neutral policy should keep the behavior bounded, but adding in addition stochastic experimentation should allow it to learn.
Limited Rationality
A very important thing to keep in mind about this system is that it employs limited rationality. It is a dumb system. and it is very deliberately dumb : it has been designed t,o be dumb and slow because foreign policy bureaucracies are, arguably, dumb and slow. As it turns out .it is because of this that the simulation models plausible behaviors fairly well. It is, in fact, sometimes a frustrating system to watch, since, for example, a weak colonial power will be sitting around for a while waiting to be picked off, and the system will be agonizingly slow in getting around to it. This is a very different type of behavior than most simulations that I am aware of. which usually operate much more quickly and are far more likely to exhibit optimal behavior. All-machine simulations do this through mathematical optimization techniques which are often extremely clever and information-intensive techniques: human decision-makers in human-machine simulations often shift policies more quickly and with fewer constraints than real-world bureaucracies 3. RESULTS
Parameter Settings
The system was tested with the parameter values set as shown in the Appendix. The basic system studied was initialized with twenty independent nations of three general types The system contains five large, five medium. and ten small nations. Colonial and trade linkages were initially set at zero. The values of the remaining parameters are given in the Appendix. These provide for a simulated world where large powers benefit primarily from imperialism and trade. War is a fairly costly proposition, costing all of yearly military expenditure when fought between equals. Colonial exploitation is ruthless and extracts a sizeable percentage (10% ) of the GNP of the colonized nation, so the colony suffers limited growth as a consequence. The comparative advantage of trade gives 2% advantage to trading over internal growth. so there is a positive incentive to trade. Large and medium powers have relatively slow economic growth, and the large powers spend a great deal on the military. The small nations have much higher growth but start out with only a fraction of the wealth of the large powers.
As with all simulations, these parameter values are, of course, somewhat arbitrary. and in the little experimenting I did, the system does not appear highly sensitive to the parameters, though some changes occur. In terms of timing. the relation of simulation time to -real" time is probably something I; 'e three or four to one: in other words. in five simulation years, one sees a level of activity which might be appropriate for twenty years
Overall Behavior
The simulation was run a large number of times and the behavior observed. Two of these runs are summarized at the end of the paper in a script which reports the actions taken in each year, and a statistical summary which shows the state of the system at five year intervals. One run, labeled the Trade Exhibit. has a great deal of trade activity ar d is somewhat atypical: this run shows some interesting colonial activity as well The othfr run. labeled the Imperialism Exhibit, is more typical of the behavior except for the relative absence of war in the latter half of the run.
Th e first and most fundamental observation about the behavior of the system is that it works: the exhibited behaviors are table (in the sense that the system is self-correcting), there is quite a variety of plausible activity and interaction, and the system does not. immediately degenerate into a predictable pattern based on the initial conditions(e.g. a single powerful nation). This, in turn, is a problem for describing the system: it can in fact exhibit a number of different behaviors. The comments in this section will therefore try to give a general indication of how the system seems to he operating in addition to dealing with the two runs which are presented.
One of the most interesting characteristics of the system is the variety of different types of behavior individual nations can exhibit. While, as one would expect, large nations tend to remain large and small nations tend to get colonized, counter-examples occur. Frequently one or more of the minor nations will end up larger than the middle or major nations, and in one run a minor nation managed to grow sufficiently large to colonize a major nation that had been on the losing end of several wars. IL all cases a great deal of shuffling in size occurs between the beginning and end of the simulation. and one can see the rise and fall of empires and trading systems in some runs.
Experimentation .vs. Precedent-Seeking
As is apparent from the text listings, the most frequent factor in changing behavior is experimentation rather than precedent seeking. though precedent-seeking is used on some occasions. However, the sheer frequency is somewhat deceptive for a couple of reasons. First, quite a bit of inappropriate experimentation is done, such as the use of the DeCol strategy by nations without colonies. the Autarky strategy by nations not engaged in trade, and the Imper strategy by nations too small to find anyone to colonize. These innovations are unsuccessful and the nation reverts to Neutral status. Obviously a couple of lines of code could eliminate such experiments.
Overall the precedent-seeking which does occur seems to have more impact on the system than the random experimentation. The two policies which diffuse are the lmper and Liberal strategies, and when the system is particularly ripe for imperialism (such as when several minor nations have obtained sufficient wealth that they are attractive targets and via their experimentation with the Pac strategy have reduced their Milex ), it will diffuse through the system cuid there will be a fairly quick (ten year) transition from a state of one or two colonies to ten or more.
As the scripts make clear, one of the most frequent policies adopted is Neutral. There is a simple, and not wholly credible, reason for this. The most frequent cause for an increase in performance which is the ratio of observed to expected GNP is through gaining a trading partner, which can only be done if one is in the Neutral or Liberal mode Ergo, even though the renzn for the good performance is trade --which 'would imply adopting a Liberal policy --the actual policy which led to that trade may be Neutral. I haven't decided whether this should be considered a bug or a feature.
The limits for setting policy Bad_Policy and OK_Policy were probably set too wide to evoke a lot of precedent-seeking --the performance measures are almost always within a couple percentage points of 1.0 and the policy change points were set at about five points outside 1.0. Narrowing the range of these parameters would increase the use of precedent-seeking and policy reversal.
Imperialism
With the settings of the system parameters used in the simulation runs, the system almost invariably ends up with some colonialism, though these can take a variety of forms. The typical run ends up with three or four nations acquiring colonies. The colonial systems established at the end of the simulation usually were accumulated through a combination of direct imperialism and winning wars against other colonial powers, a feature having much in common with the European system.
Because possession of colonies attracts attackers, it is difficult for a middle power to hold onto colonies. In the typical run, middle powers acquire colonies early on, but those colonies are then taken by a larger nation. Exceptions to this occur when the middle power has also acquired sufficient trade links to build up adequate GNP to resist attacks by larger powers. or is just plain lucky and is not successfully attacked Because the level of exploitation of the colony by the imperial power is set fairly high (10% of GNP per year), a nation which is colonized early in the simulation will experienced a declining GNP the remainder of the time. The situation of Fa llia in the Imperialism Exhibit (where imperialism occurs fairly late in the simulation ), or of Asgard. Damogran Sol III and Al Centu in the Trade Exhibit are typical of this pattern This means that in the long run. the colonies are of little use to the imperial power, and in fact probably only 1 7 serve to attract attackers. Thus, for example. Al Centu manages to go through four owners 2',0 Jaglan B, Altair. Sirius and Dentrass) in twenty years while its GNP of arounclAcontributes virtually nothing to its owners As such, Al Centu acts as the Lebanon of PWORLD.
The acquisition of Al Centu by Jaglan B illustrates one other fairly common phenomenon. which is small powers picking ,,p colonies discarded by larger powers. Al Centu was originally colonized by Dentrass. its GNP was driven to low levels, then dropped by Dentrass and briefly picked up as a colony by Jaglan B. This type of exchange occure fairly often late in the simulation. Because colonizers have to be substantially larger than colonies (4 times in this case). about the only way a small power can be imperialist is to take over a colony previously bankrupted by another coloni7er.
Decolonization occurs entirely by experiment and seems to be a fairly innt,euous to positive strategy. Since colonization usually reduces the GNP of colonies to a fairly worthless level anyway (unless those colonies have strong trade links), discarding them results in little economic loss and reduces both Milex and the possibility that one will be the target of a bellicist nation. Since decolonization is a strategy which is only meaningful for nations which have colonies in the first place, and at any given time usually only a small fraction of the nations in the system have colonies, decolonization is unlikely to diffuse as a strategy in the system, but. does provide some additional flexibility in the behavior pattern exhibited.
Trade
The Trade Exhibit shows a system which is dominated by trade links, though it also has some imperialism. Because trade is doi.Le with nations closest in size, one frequently finds some sets of 2 to 4 nations which are strongly engaged in mutual trade, exchanging multiple chunks of trade with the same rartner. Thus, in the Trade Exhibit. Algol, Fallia and Jaglan B are engaging in mutual trade. as are Arcturus and Den crass, and Viltvodl and Eadrax.
Trade is clearly the "power strategy" in this simulation, since it increases the rate of' growth. The strong interlinkage between Viltvodl and Eadrax illustrates this the two nations far surpass the others in growth due to their maximal (2n ) trade linkages. This stra.,r,y also is pursued by the smaller nations for example it is not uncommon to see strong linkages between SoJ III, Bethsela and Al Centu (when they avoie being colonized ) 1:....4.ce they are at the bottom of the list in wealth Once those linkages are established, those nations grow together and at times become quite large.
In some early experiments. I raised the TradeJVIult parameter to 4r/o and this resulted in much stronger tendencies to establish trade links that the example given here At the 18 4% trade level, many nations quickly established strong trading re!ationships, up to the maximum amount Max_Trade. In fact, one fairly common pattern is the establishment of a system which is primarily driven by trade ',with relatively little conflict. This is more likely to occur when a number of nations experiment with the Pacifist strategy early in the simulation: this has the effect of increasing growth to give good performance, and decreasef; the military strength so that if a major nation does experiment with imperialism or war, it draws or loses. Ironically, a loss in a non-imperialist war may augment a trading strategy, as it halves Milex. Since trading nations have, in the long run, high amounts of growth, they eventually become too large to be successfully ix;tacked.
War
As noted earlier, the system was designed to make war a risky proposition, and as a consequence one did not, for the most part, find nations engaging in a lot of war. As the summaries indicate, the median number of wars is around 3, and since each war is counted twice (once tor the initiator and once for the defender), this means a median of 1.5 wars initiated.
The primary function of war seems to be as a disincentive of colonialism, particularly by smaller powers. Since a bellicist nation decides who to attack based on which nation smaller thao. it has the largest number of colonies, a middle power acquiring colonies becomes a lightening rod for attacks by larger Aations. The typical situation for a middle power acquiring colonies early in the simulation is to lose them in a war. A counterexample is found in the Imperialism Exhibit, where the middle power Eadrax acquires colonies and then since no major powers subsequently experiment with the Bellicist mode, it keeps those colonies. The more typical pattern is the acquisition and then loss through war of colonies by Altair, Jaglan B and Sirius in the Trade Exhibit.
Since a successful war results in a transfer of GNP from the defeated to the victor, it results in a temporary increase in the Perform index and hence is a policy likely to be imitated. However, because wars only result in an increase when won, and draws (which cost) are quite likely against nations roughly the same size, war (unlike imperialism) does not work well as a general strategy.
An example of the effects of high war involvement is Altair in the Trade Exhibit, which experienced an unusually high total of 17 wars in the fifty-year period. Altair acquires two colonies early (by year 15), which subsequently makes it a prime target for au.acks. Thus Altair is attacked by Megratha, which is only slightly larger than Altair in size, in years 23, 24, 27, and 28 but Megratha draws each time (meanwhile Megratha, initially a major power, has become comparable in size to Altair through the lack of any 19 trade and all these wars...). Altair continues to survive attacks. fends off a revolt by Damogrzzi. attacks and defeats the slightly smaller Jag Ian B on the second try at a war. acquiring a third colony in the process and finally succumbs in a war with Sirius, by now almost ten times larger. The upshot of all of this activity, however leaves Altair, originally a midthe power. at about half the GNP le:el of the uncolonized minor powers.
The opposite strategy of war. Pacifism (reduction of Milex) is used a lot experimentally and can be used quite successfully. So, for example, the large3t nation in the Trade Exhibit by year 5. is Viltvodl. which had reduced Milex to the ni..nimal 0.01 level by year 10, and in the Imperialism Exhibit. Viltvodl (name is coincidental) has the second largest GNP with a Milex of 0.018. The strategy used by both Viltvodl's is to combine high trade and low Milex so that the sheer size of the GNP produces a total military expenditure large enough to deter attacks.
Discussion and Conclusion
The discussion above gives a general flavor for the type of behavior exhibited in the simulation. In general. the patterns generated are highly varied but at the same time plausible, and the behavior of the system remains bounded.
So, what good is this? While I would hardly expect this to replace GLOBUS or SARUM(it also cost somewhat less...), it might have some utility. First, it ,.hows that. a system primarily driven by qualitative policy change can exhibit plausible and bounded international behavior. Given the increasing interest in qualitative and rule-based models, and more generally a movement in the formal modeling community away from simplistic attempts to fit international relations into the Procrustean bed of classical mathematics, this type of effort might find some use. Second, to the extent that the precedent-based policy making as opposed to experimentation was utilized, the model indicates that this can be incorporated as a dynamic mechani3m. In particular. it is my opinion that. the bounded rationality incorporated into this model provides more plausible and interesting patterns than the mathematically optimizing routines found in some earlier work. Finally, the model is pet-haps useful as a scenario generator. showing how a system might evolve from a given set of initial conditions based on random policy experimentation More generally, what the model provides, through multiple simulation runs. is an envelope of possibilities of system evolution from a given initial value and set of parameters rather than making a single point prediction. in other words while the model produces a variety of behaviors, it does not produce infinitely varied behaviors. For 20 example, some imperialism is found in virtually all of the runs, but unlike some optimizing simulations which incorporate imperialism, one never gets the "Roman empire" scenario, where a single nation comes to dominate the entire system. Thus under the initial conditions I've worked with, limited imperialism is inside the envelope of possibilities: total imperialism is outside of it.
This envelope of possibilities approach in turn relates somewhat to issues in the mathematical theory of chaos, which can be used to describe systems whose general behavior is predictable but whose specific, micro-level behavior is not. Thus, for nample, one can predict the general characteristics of the turbulent flow of smoke rising from a cigarette --the smoke will generally rise, it will contain whorls which have generally predictable shapes and movements and the smoke will generally respond in predictable ways to disturbances such as a light breeze but the exact path of any given particle in the stream of smoke is effectively unpredictable because of the chaotic nature of the equations describing its dynamics. These envelopes are essentially the same as the set predictions which, as I've argued extensively elsewhere (Schrodt 1986a (Schrodt ,1986b , are probably more useful than point prediction in modeling international events.
The model as it stands is probably a bit too dumb, and could use a little more intelligence and a little slowing down to be more finely tuned. Clearly the level of experimentation is too high, though it was set high in part to see whether a highly random environment would crash the system, which it did not. This would involve a simple parameter change. Second. the memory of the system is very short the time horizon I used was only two or three years (depending on how you count). The ideal system would bias a nation towards first looking for past precedents in its own history and looking over all of that history rather than simply scanning the current system. That, in turn, would probably mean that there was more adoption of strategies other than the Neutral strategy. since a nation could find non-Neutral strategies in its past even if' those were the only examples available in the present. This could be done with a bit of a programming and a lot of investment of additional memory. Finally, a few more rules might make the system behave a bit more credibly: for example a lot of experimentation is currently inappropriate for the nations involved (e.g. decolonization for nations with no colonies) 21 1.00
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